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The genetic modification of microalgal strains for enhanced or modified metabolic activity 16 
shows great promise for biotechnological exploitation. However, of key concern for many is the 17 
safety of genetic modification technology and genetically modified organisms with regard to 18 
both the environment and human health, and how these concerns are met will play a key role in 19 
ensuring how successful commercialisation of genetically modified (GM) algae is achieved. 20 
Commercialisation opportunities for GM microalgae will inevitably require translation from 21 
laboratory to industrial settings, on scales beyond those typically associated with the current 22 
biotechnology sector. Here we provide an overview of the current situation with regards to 23 
genetic modification techniques and legislation, and the implications of large-scale cultivation 24 
with regards to developing a safe and effective risk assessment system for contained and 25 
uncontained activities. We discuss the rationale and options for modification and the 26 
implications for risks associated with scale up to human health and the environment, current grey 27 
areas in political/technical legislation, the use of contained/uncontained production systems, 28 
deliberate release and monitoring strategies. We conclude that while existing procedures are not 29 
entirely sufficient for accurate and exhaustive risk assessment, there exists a substantial 30 
knowledge base and expertise within the existing aquaculture, fermentation and (algal) 31 
biotechnology industries that can be combined and applied to ensure safe use in the future.  32 
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1. Introduction 37 
Microalgae represent a highly diverse assemblage of photosynthetic microorganisms found over 38 
a wide range of environmental habitats, from fresh water through to hyper saline, and spanning a 39 
wide range of both temperature and pH tolerances [1, 2].  Containing both eukaryotic and 40 
prokaryotic (cyanobacteria) members, the general term ‘microalgae’ is used here to encapsulate 41 
this broad grouping of photosynthetic microorganisms with their diverse metabolic potential and 42 
function.  43 
Production of microalgal biomass does not require high quality land resources, as is the case of 44 
plant crops, and in comparison to large scale fermentation vessel grown yeast or bacteria, these 45 
photosynthetic microorganisms have low input requirements (light and micronutrients) whilst 46 
producing large amounts of biomass over short periods of time [3]. Microalgae culturing has a 47 
significant requirement for water resources which are often scarce. However many species can  48 
be grown in saline or brackish waters, reducing impact on increasingly valuable fresh water 49 
supplies, or on nutrient rich waste waters that are not suitable for agriculture or human 50 
consumption [4].  Combining photosynthetic/heterotrophic growth with waste water 51 
treatment/remediation and/or CO2 capture could not only reduce production costs but has the 52 
potential to offer “added value services” to the process of algal biomass generation. 53 
Commercial viability of algal derived products will most likely be achieved by combining 54 
commercialisation of high-value, low-volume  products  such as β-carotene, docosahexaenoic 55 
acid and eicosahexaenoic acid with the  production of low-value, high-volume products like 56 
feeds, fertilisers and biofuels [5].  57 
 58 
GM microalgae and current legislation  59 
  
Many algal species have become successfully established as suitable for mass culture [6, 7], 60 
predominantly aquaculture related, but including production for food and feeds, waste water 61 
treatment, fertiliser, biofuels, fine chemicals, and pharmaceuticals [8, 9] .The advent of the 62 
genomic era has heralded a new dawn in microalgal exploitation potential by allowing the 63 
combination and selection of key physiological characteristics with modified metabolic 64 
activities, enhancing production of native compounds relative to wild type strains or introducing 65 
genes for the production of additional non-native compounds or added functionality. 66 
Microalgae have been commercially cultured for well over 40 years and the systems currently 67 
utilised at scale tend to be unsophisticated shallow open ponds with no artificial mixing or, 68 
alternatively, paddle wheel mixed raceway ponds, both of which can cover hundreds of hectares 69 
in size [10]. Commercialisation of genetically modified (GM) microalgae for industrial purposes 70 
will inevitably require the culturing of GM microalgae at this kind of large-scale, but this will 71 
require more stringent risk assessment and environmental management strategies than those 72 
utilised for the unmodified wild type algae currently being grown. Much can be learnt from 73 
existing ‘large-scale’ enclosed culture practices exploiting GM bacterial and yeast strains which 74 
are typically grown in fermenter-style reactors. Even at smaller scales (e.g. for the production of 75 
the highest value products), the utilisation of ‘closed’ photobioreactor (PBR) systems still 76 
requires the effective exposure of the algae to light, the agitation of liquid media to enhance 77 
nutrient mixing, and for the removal of toxic oxygen build up; creating multiple opportunities for 78 
environmental exposure and, therefore, potentially a significant barrier to commercialisation 79 
when these organisms are genetically modified.  80 
The industrial biotechnology sector has so far been slow to respond to GM algae with most 81 
projects never leaving the research laboratory setting. Only a few collaborative ventures such as 82 
  
a recent project carried out by Plymouth Marine Laboratory and Rothamsted Research utilising a 83 
genetically modified P. tricornutum strain expressing heterologous ∆5- elongase for the 84 
accumulation of high value omega 3 long chain fatty acids  [11], and a commercial venture 85 
between Sapphire Energy and UC San Diego ever reach pilot scale . This is in part due to a 86 
fundamental lack of information and assessment tools available to researchers, industrial 87 
developers or regulators on the risks associated with the large scale propagation of GM 88 
microalgae, as well as a lack of suitable facilities to undertake essential pilot scale trials. Yet, 89 
even these relatively small trials (<2000 litres) have highlighted the pressing need for the 90 
development of tools and mechanisms to aid the technical aspects of GM microalgal cultivation, 91 
containment and risk assessment, and crucially to consider the legislative and political aspects of 92 
such activities.  93 
To begin with, it is important to define exactly what is meant by the term ‘Genetic Modification’. 94 
The term genetically modified organism (GMO) is used to refer to any microorganism, plant, or 95 
animal in which genetic engineering techniques have been used to introduce, remove, or modify 96 
specific parts of its genome. It should be noted however that techniques that replicate naturally 97 
occurring phenomenon such as random mutagenesis are not generally considered to result in 98 
GMOs under European guidelines and are therefore not subject to GM control measures or 99 
legislation[12]. Indeed,  it is worthy of note that more than 2,500 plant varieties in 175 plant 100 
species, both crop and decorative, have been created by random mutagenesis and released 101 
without fanfare into the environment over the past 75 years [13].   102 
There are many strategies for enhancing algal phenotypes, including random mutagenesis, 103 
traditional recombinant nucleic acid technologies, and genome editing tools including 104 
transcription activator-like effector nucleases (TALENs), zinc-finger nucleases (ZFNs), and 105 
  
RNA-guided engineered nucleases (RGENs) derived from the bacterial clustered regularly 106 
interspaced short palindromic repeat (CRISPR)–Cas9 system [14]. 107 
Whether any of these new technologies produce a ‘GMO’ depends largely on the country 108 
involved: e.g. in European countries the definition of GMO is mostly associated with the 109 
synthetic introduction of genetic material into an organism to create a novel organism via the use 110 
of recombinant nucleic acid technologies, though there are ongoing debates about the definition 111 
of what constitutes a GMO and the genetic technologies involved. It is unclear how existing 112 
legislations around the world will address the new developments and capabilities around genome 113 
editing techniques such as CRISPR/Cas9. Direct delivery of guide RNA alongside purified Cas 9 114 
protein into microalgal cells, as opposed to plasmid-mediated delivery for example, is likely to 115 
bypass the GMO legislation in the USA, since the genome editing complex is degraded in the 116 
recipient cell leaving no trace of foreign DNA [15]. Indeed, it is worthy of note that the US 117 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) has decided that it will not regulate a mushroom which has 118 
been genetically modified using the CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing tool [16], thus setting a  119 
precedent of CRISPR/Cas9 derived plants being considered non-GMO in the USA. Whether this 120 
technique will fall under GMO legislation in the European Union will depend on the 121 
interpretation of the 2001 Directive on the Deliberate Release of GM Organisms into the 122 
Environment [12]  which stipulates that techniques of genetic modification include “recombinant 123 
nucleic acid techniques involving the formation of new combinations of genetic material by the 124 
insertion of nucleic acid molecules produced by whatever means outside an organism into any 125 
virus, bacterial plasmid or other vector system and their incorporation into a host organism in 126 
which they do not naturally occur but which they are capable of continued propagation”. This 127 
legislation was formulated before the advent of gene editing techniques such as the 128 
  
CRISPR/Cas9 technology and whether this technique is considered “targeted mutagenesis” (not 129 
GM) or the formation of new genetic material (GM) is likely to create significant debate in the 130 
future as more R&D projects are commercialised that incorporate this versatile and powerful 131 
technology. This failure of regulation to keep up to date with the GM technology advances has 132 
created an element of unease; while the European Commission debates this conundrum and 133 
repeatedly delays the decision, the legal limbo of gene editing is having a big impact on research 134 
[17] which will inevitably impact any commercialisation of genetically edited microalgae.  135 
Currently, within Europe there is legislation covering aspects of GMOs from deliberate release 136 
[12], environmental protection and remedying of environmental damage [18], GMOs  in  food 137 
and feed [19],  and labelling [20], to list but a few. However, within the scope of these directives 138 
each member state is able to take further measures of regulation, management and control of 139 
GMOs.  Other countries around the world follow their own sets of legislative rules. Despite the 140 
potential for wide disparity globally, fortunately most legislation is built on the requirements of 141 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity [21] which 142 
provides international guidelines on the regulation and management of living modified 143 
organisms (LMOs) . 144 
 145 
Public concern 146 
A major factor holding back industry uptake of GMOs is public concern resulting from intensive 147 
campaigns by both media and NGOs. Sensationalised press coverage and lack of appropriate 148 
communication from the scientific community to the general public has left many fearful and 149 
suspicious of GM technologies and, as a result, resistant to buying products containing them. 150 
Several reports commissioned by the UK Government and Research Councils have indicated that 151 
  
communication between those involved in science and the general public must be improved and 152 
that engagement at an early stage is important for improving understanding [22]. It was also 153 
found that through free-flowing dialog, many issues surrounding the use of industrial 154 
biotechnology could be addressed and no longer present significant concerns to the general 155 
public [23]. Of key concern for many is the safety of GM technology and GMOs with regard to 156 
both the environment and human health, and how these concerns are met will play a key role in 157 
ensuring how successful commercialisation of GM algae is achieved. Thus, it is important that 158 
the potential of microalgae to contribute to future energy and food security, as well as human and 159 
environmental health, is not undermined before the platforms can become established. In a new 160 
era of increasingly ready access to genetically modified microalgae, there is a crucial 161 
requirement for an environmental risk assessment (ERA) system which can uphold and 162 
withstand the rigours of safety legislation, as well as be able to cope with a rapidly changing 163 
research and development backdrop.  164 
 165 
Environmental and health risks 166 
Release of microalgae into the environment could have potential negative ecological effects such 167 
as altering food webs, displacing native phytoplankton, causing local extinctions, hazardous algal 168 
bloom (HAB) formation,  and having serious societal effects where harmful/toxic strains are 169 
involved [24]. Many of the risks to human health and the environment associated with 170 
production of a given GM microalgae will be specific to the types of traits and genes selected 171 
and the type of modifications performed. These GMO specific risks should be considered 172 
alongside the risks of general large scale algae production and potential release into the 173 
environment. In addition to the specific traits associated with the GM element of the microalgae 174 
  
other considerations will need to be made such as choice of algae (HAB formers or known 175 
invasive strains will have a higher associated risk), type and location of growth and containment 176 
facility, and the risk of horizontal gene transfer from the GM algae to other organisms in the 177 
environment.   178 
Many of the algae currently being modified are not native to the geographic areas in which they 179 
are generally cultivated and are often chosen for their rapid growth rate and overall hardiness 180 
which maximises biomass productivity. Whilst there is currently very little regulatory control 181 
over the importation and release of non-native algal strains into the environment, such as in the 182 
use of microalgae in aquaculture [24], the risks associated with non-native invasion should also 183 
be considered. The actual environmental risk associated with large algae spills therefore will not 184 
be limited to the GM aspect of these organisms but rather a combination of factors including the 185 
fitness of the invading algae, the fitness of the indigenous alga populations, modes of 186 
competition for the resident and invading species, and intricacies and population stability 187 
characteristics of the disrupted ecological system  [25].  Indeed, since some transgenes reduce 188 
the fitness of recipient algae below the fitness of respective wild types, an important aspect of the 189 
risk analysis can therefore be based on the environmental risks associated with cultivating the 190 
wildtype [26].   191 
That said, successful environmental invasion and establishment does not necessary require rapid 192 
growth rate of the invader or even population dominance, just a low level persistence or a 193 
potential for gene flow, which will be determined by the difference in relative resource limitation 194 
between the ‘alien’ and native species [27].  195 
 196 
2. GM Microalgae: Initial Considerations  197 
  
It is generally accepted that the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment is, in most 198 
cases, a necessary step in the development of new products derived from or containing GM 199 
algae, and that these organisms, whether released into the environment in large or small amounts, 200 
may survive, reproduce and spread, and that the effects of such releases on the environment may 201 
be irreversible [18]. Accordingly, before GM algae production can start, an application must be 202 
made to the relevant authorities for regulatory approval to release or market the algae and/or its 203 
derived products. These applications focus on a risk assessment covering human health, 204 
environmental protection, labelling and product use [28]. In addition, since public concerns 205 
could be a major barrier to commercialisation of GM algae (depending on the product type), 206 
information handling and release should be engaging and transparent, and be considered as part 207 
of, or in addition to, the risk assessment, to mitigate possibility of commercial failure due to 208 
product rejection by consumers in response to concerns raised by activist groups. Figure 1 209 
describes a decision support system outlining the interacting components involved in industrial 210 
scale production of GM algae. Rather than a linear start at step 1 and end at step 11, each level 211 
interplays and is often dependent on the levels above and below, which can make the decision 212 
process complex. For example starting with any fixed parameters such as the type of algae to be 213 
produced and the end product marketed, Figure 1 can give the operator an indication of types of 214 
other decisions that would need to be considered and from there the risks involved can be 215 
assessed. The consideration of the risks associated with each aspect of the product and process, 216 
both independently and as a part of the whole, is a critical part of the risk assessment and failure 217 
to do so could result in rejection of an application and subsequent avoidable commercial failure. 218 
Further to the processes outlined below and in Figure 1, environmental monitoring (ideally prior 219 
to, during and post cultivation activity) must also be included as part of the environmental risk 220 
  
assessment, however the financial implications of such activities can potentially be onerous and, 221 
in theory, ad infinitum. Lessons should be learned for example from the mining industry, to 222 
avoid tax payers shouldering the burden of any clean up, remediation and/or monitoring 223 
activities, long after industry has ceased production.  Additionally, whilst a major aspect of the 224 
risk assessment should be focused on the GM component, other more general factors (traits of 225 
the non GM parent microalgae) should also be taken into consideration at this early stage– for 226 
example, is the algae of choice a native or wild-type to the area in which it will be cultivated, or 227 
is it considered a biosecurity hazard in certain environments or conditions? Non-GM algae 228 
discharged in to a non-native area could be just as much of a risk to the environment in the event 229 
of a release as any GM traits, and possibly more so if the GM algae are designed to be less 230 
competitive in natural ecosystems. 231 
Choice of Microalgae 232 
Since most GM modifications are built on the back of the natural algal metabolic potential, 233 
choice of species will be largely dependent on these base algae traits (e.g. oleaginous, high 234 
carotenoid production, rapid growth rate). The choices of algae and the nature of the 235 
modification will ultimately have a major impact on the risk assessment, since there are multiple 236 
factors to consider including local environmental conditions, existing infrastructure, budget, the 237 
growth medium, the scale of operation, as well as the final product. From cyanobacteria to 238 
dinoflagellates, as many as 300 diverse species of microalgae are reported to form blooms in the 239 
natural environment and nearly a quarter of these species are known to produce toxins. These 240 
species are known as ‘Harmful Algal Bloom’ (HAB) formers and fall into 2 categories [29]; The 241 
high-biomass producers, which can cause large regions of hypoxia resulting in indiscriminate 242 
kills of marine life after reaching dense concentrations  [25], and the toxin producers such as 243 
  
Gymnodinium mikimotoi [30] and Karenia brevis [31] that contaminate food supplies causing 244 
massive fish kills and the death of animals and birds [32]. Toxins are often present in the water 245 
where wave action can create aerosols containing toxins and cellular debris. Animals, including 246 
humans, are exposed to toxins when consuming contaminated seafood, have contact with 247 
contaminated water or inhale contaminated aerosols [33]. Some of these species such as 248 
Alexandrium fundyense [34] have toxic effects at low cell densities and do not need to form high 249 
density “blooms” to cause problems; the large scale, albeit controlled, cultivation of any such 250 
strains (and their GM derivatives) can therefore pose a serious risk to human health. Use of HAB 251 
forming algae should be avoided if possible (unless the toxin itself is the desired product), or 252 
strains should be additionally modified to reduce toxin production potential. Furthermore, 253 
assessment should assess the likelihood of genetic modification unintentionally causing a 254 
normally non-harmful alga (or any other organism capable of uptake of the genetic material), to 255 
start producing a toxin. Safety of human operators and any nearby populace is crucial and must 256 
be considered if a toxin producing strain is used in any situation.  GM algal species used in an 257 
area not native to the non-GM wild-type parent must be considered as potentially invasive and 258 
risk assessed as such, since the release of such a species could pose a serious ecological threat 259 
regardless of the presence or absence of genetic modification. 260 
 261 
Crop protection 262 
Even without the GMO component,  the sustainability of large-scale microalgae growth is a 263 
major challenge since, much like terrestrial crops, large algal monocultures will inevitably be 264 
invaded by pathogens and pests [35]. Microalgae growth facilities are an excellent habitat for a 265 
wide variety of unwanted microorganisms which are usually detrimental to productivity. 266 
  
Parasites and predators such as fungi, protozoans, viruses or aquatic invertebrates [36, 37] will 267 
reduce productivity by consuming or killing the microalgae crop, and invasion by other algae 268 
could affect productivity by outcompeting the GM strain. 269 
Approaches to mitigate crop losses could include identifying strains resistant to pathogens, or 270 
even using GM technologies to engineer specific pest resistance into production species. Given 271 
how rapidly pathogens evolve, new strains would need to be continually developed. GM algal 272 
strains prepared in this way would have a clear competitive advantage over their wild type 273 
counterparts and this would need to be taken into consideration when preparing the risk 274 
assessment concerning potential environmental impact in the event of a release. 275 
The use of extremophile algae, tolerant to high or low temperature, pH or salinity gives a boost 276 
to productivity by enabling growth under conditions too extreme for most potential 277 
contaminants. A practical downside is that extremophiles often grow very slowly and so a 278 
balance needs to be sought between growth rate and the need to keep contaminants to a 279 
minimum. Whilst the majority of currently commercially produced (wild-type) algal strains are 280 
not extremophiles there are some significant exceptions such as carotenoid and astaxanthin rich 281 
halotolerant species Dunaliella salina and  Haematococcus pluvialis [38]. The incorporation of 282 
novel genes into extremophiles not currently being exploited could open up new markets. 283 
Additionally, use of species such as thermophilic and acidophilic alga Cyanidium caldarium, 284 
which is cultivated at below pH 5 and temperatures up to 56°C [39], could allow for direct 285 
carbon capture from industrial flue gas, thus adding value while increasing crop protection. From 286 
an environmental protection stance, the use of genetically modified extremophiles offers a 287 
unique advantage in that the majority of these organisms if released into the local environment 288 
  
would quickly die out due to inability to adapt to the altered conditions, or would be out-289 
competed by the plethora of microorganisms already adapted to thrive under ambient 290 
environmental conditions.  291 
 292 
Traits of Genetically Modified Microalgae 293 
Targeted genetic modification is undertaken to enhance, redirect or reduce the production of 294 
enzymes or metabolites. Table 1 provides a brief overview of some of the ways in which 295 
researchers have already genetically modified algae with commercial exploitation in mind. 296 
However, the act of altering the function of one metabolic pathway often has implications for 297 
other non-targeted pathways, thereby potentially affecting their competitive fitness under natural 298 
conditions and possibly their role in the food web should escape/release occur. For example, 299 
increasing the cellular production of a given metabolite by changing the flux of material down a 300 
given pathway, could cause an unintended reduction in cell growth by disrupting natural 301 
intracellular resource allocation. In assessing the risk of a given GM algae to the environment, 302 
any advantages conferred by the new/modified genes/pathways and any corresponding 303 
disadvantages compared to the wild-type, and additionally how the transgenes may affect other 304 
environmental microorganisms should they be transferred via HGT will need to be considered. 305 
The potential adverse environmental consequences of GM algae will be intrinsically linked to 306 
how the organism has been modified [25]. In addition, many GM techniques use the transfer of 307 
selective or marker genes in addition to the main transgene, and as such the risks and impact 308 
posed by these peripheral heterologous genes will also need to be considered (see below).  309 
Information on the safety of the GM algae should also be sought, partially regarding any toxic, 310 
  
allergenic or other harmful effects arising from the genetic modification, especially where the 311 
algae or algae product would be destined for the food feed or pharmaceutical sectors. 312 
 313 
Selective genes and markers 314 
Antibiotic, herbicide and fungicide resistance 315 
There are two types of ‘marker’ genes used during genetic modification of algae: genes which 316 
confer resistance to a selective agent; and reporter genes which produce products that can be 317 
detected visually or by biochemical assay. The use of selective (antibiotic, pesticide and 318 
herbicide) and reporter (fluorescent protein) marker genes are initially required for efficient 319 
screening for successfully modified algal cells and are often inserted into the genome alongside 320 
the gene of interest. Although these marker genes often play no further role in the desired 321 
phenotypes of the GM algae at the production stage, they usually remain in the genomes. 322 
Additionally, selective genes can be used as an active trait in the final production strain – for 323 
example a strain engineered with a herbicide resistance gene can be treated with this compound 324 
to ensure monoculture growth of the GM strain and prevent invasion of the culture by faster 325 
growing competitor species [40]. In the context of use for both initial selection and as an active 326 
production trait these genes pose two potential risks. Firstly, their protein products may directly 327 
or indirectly have a negative effect on people and/or animals that consume or come into contact 328 
with the algae and secondly, algae possessing these genes may cause environmental harm by 329 
promoting gene transfer to other organisms or by providing the GM algae with a selective 330 
advantage in a normally inhospitable environment. Antibiotic, herbicide and pesticide resistance 331 
genes may provide GM algae with a significant advantage if inadvertently released into a 332 
watercourse fed with agricultural land run-off rich in such selective agents, and could therefore 333 
  
cause substantial disruption of natural communities. Additionally, the horizontal gene transfer of 334 
antibiotic or pesticide resistance genes to other microorganisms in the environment has the 335 
potential not only to put humans at risk via the creation of so called “superbugs”, but also to 336 
cause ecological imbalances by allowing previously innocuous microorganisms to grow 337 
unchecked [41]. Indeed, given the potential impact to human health surrounding the prevalence 338 
of antibiotic resistance and the paucity of new antibiotics on to the market, this aspect should be 339 
taken into particular consideration when conducting the risk assessment of GM algae containing 340 
such genes  [18]. Safety concerns have led to the development of several strategies to eliminate 341 
these genes from the genome after they have fulfilled their purpose (transposition,  site-specific 342 
recombination, homologous recombination, co-transformation and gene editing) [42, 43]. 343 
Removal of such selective genes prior to commercialisation would aid considerably in associated 344 
risk reduction. Indeed, in April 2004 The European Food Safety Authority’s (EFSA’s) scientific 345 
panel on genetically modified organisms issued a detailed opinion on the wide-scale use of 346 
antibiotic resistance genes in genetically modified plants, including considerations of the 347 
environmental risks [44]. Whilst this report was specifically with reference to GM plants, it is 348 
also directly applicable to the use of resistance genes in GM algae.  EFSA concluded that each 349 
antibiotic resistance gene should be assigned to one of three groups (see Table 2).  350 
Group 1 contains antibiotic resistance genes which are already widely distributed among micro-351 
organisms in the environment (soil, plant, water and the mammalian gut) and confer resistance to 352 
antibiotics which have no or only minor therapeutic relevance in human medicine and restricted 353 
use in defined areas of veterinary medicine. Regardless as to whether the genes are left over from 354 
the transformation process or being actively used for maintaining a unialgal culture condition, 355 
the presence of these antibiotics resistance genes in the genome of transgenic algae is extremely 356 
  
unlikely to change the existing spread of these genes in the environment or significantly impact 357 
human and animal health. Group 2 contains genes which confer resistance to antibiotics which 358 
are used for therapy in defined areas of human and veterinary medicine. These genes are already 359 
widely distributed among microorganisms in the environment and as such their presence in GM 360 
algae will have only a minimal effect on the spread of these genes and therefore have minimal 361 
impact on human and animal health. Group 3 contains antibiotic resistance genes which confer 362 
resistance to antibiotics highly relevant for human therapy and should therefore be avoided in the 363 
genome of transgenic algae [44], so as not to expedite the widespread proliferation of resistance 364 
to these “last resort” drugs, which currently have only low level of resistance but to which 365 
resistance is already growing in clinical settings [45, 46].  366 
The choice of antibiotic selection for genetically modified microalgae is not straight forward and 367 
can be influenced by a plethora of factors including, photo, pH and temperature stability, salt 368 
compatibility and solubility of the antibiotic, liquid/solid media selection, as well as natural alga 369 
resistance and the impact of the antibiotic on associated microbiota. In the early stages of strain 370 
development at laboratory scale, such factors will likely take precedence over the downstream 371 
implications of scale up (i.e. resistance genes are chosen irrespective of their grouping).  372 
However, it is crucial to retain an awareness of the implications that marker selection can impose 373 
should the strain move forward to industrial production.  At this later stage, the grouping of the 374 
antibiotic resistance gene could then be of fundamental importance and will influence risk 375 
assessment and whether additional modification for its removal is essential, advised or 376 
unnecessary.  377 
 Zeocin is a formulation of phleomycin D1, a glycopeptide isolated from Streptomyces 378 
verticillus. Although not considered in the April 2004 European Food Safety Authority’s 379 
  
(EFSA’s) antibiotic resistance gene assessment, Zeocin has gained significant levels of 380 
popularity with algal genetic researchers over the past few years, so is worthy of note here. 381 
Resistance to Zeocin is conferred by the product of the ble gene from Streptoalloteichus 382 
hindustanus [47].  Belonging to the bleomycin family of antibiotics, it is effective against most 383 
bacteria, filamentous fungi, yeast, plant, and animal cells, and causes cell death by intercalating 384 
into DNA and inducing double-strand breaks [48]. Bleomycin is used to treat a range of cancers 385 
and is on the World Health Organization's List of Essential Medicines. It is therefore likely that 386 
the use of the ble resistance gene would be classified into group 3 and therefore if used in the 387 
creation of GM algae would need to be removed prior to commercialisation.  388 
 389 
Use of a Group 1 resistance gene does not automatically ensure that its presence in genetically 390 
modified algae can be considered as entirely low-risk during the commercialisation process. For 391 
example, the hph and hpt genes encode a hygromycin phosphotransferase (HPH) enzyme which 392 
inactivates and therefore confers resistance to the antibiotic hygromycin B [49] which, like other 393 
aminoglycosides, kills bacteria, fungi and higher eukaryote cells by inhibiting polypeptide 394 
synthesis. As an example of a Group 1 resistance gene, hph has been isolated from E. coli and 395 
Streptomyces hygroscopicus [50, 51], and is one of the most common antibiotic resistance 396 
markers used in the transformation of plants and algae.  Hygromycin B is not in human clinical 397 
use, but is licensed in the USA for veterinary use with swine and poultry. Even with a Group 1 398 
resistance gene, a GM microalgae resistant to a veterinary medicine is likely to cause particular 399 
concern in areas of intense agriculture where run off may contain high levels of this antibiotic 400 
either permanently, sporadically or during particular times of the year. In such cases, interaction 401 
  
with local agricultural, veterinary and water treatment stakeholders should form an essential part 402 
of the risk assessment process.  403 
Similarly, herbicide based selection markers may also result in risk assessment issues. The bar 404 
gene confers resistance to the herbicide glufosinate which inhibits glutamine synthetase and as a 405 
result, leads to accumulation of toxic levels of ammonia. The bar gene was originally cloned 406 
from Streptomyces hygroscopicus, the gene product of which encodes a phosphinothricin acetyl 407 
transferase (PAT) enzyme. Interspecific transfer of this Streptomyces gene into Escherichia coli 408 
showed that it could be used as a selectable marker in other bacteria [52]. GM algae carrying this 409 
marker would have a significant selective advantage in media containing the glufosinate 410 
herbicide, which is potentially beneficial if the GM microalgae are prone to culture 411 
contamination and poor long term stability. Conversely in the event of a release, this advantage 412 
would also be translated to the natural environment in regions in which glufosinate is used and 413 
subsequently runs off into water courses through other agricultural uses. In addition to being 414 
used as an herbicide for GM crops, glufosinate is also used as a desiccant to facilitate harvesting 415 
of non-GM crops.  416 
 417 
Visual and biochemical markers 418 
A range of visual and biochemical markers are frequently used in algal genetic modification to 419 
allow researchers to determine which microalgae among a large population are modified and/or 420 
to determine the gene product localisation within the cell. This is in contrast to antibiotic 421 
selection, where all living microalgae can be considered to be genetically modified. The GUS 422 
gene product β-glucuronidase provides a reporter gene assay, the colour of which depends on the 423 
substrate provided  [53].  The product of the  Luciferase gene originally isolated from the firefly 424 
  
Photinus pyralis is an oxidative enzyme that produces a bioluminescence [54]. A range of genes 425 
encoding a selection of fluorescent proteins are commonly used in selection or recombinant 426 
protein tagging, the most common of which is eGFP. Such markers are likely to be selectively 427 
neutral in the natural environment and should not confer any advantage or disadvantage on the 428 
GM strain. Indeed many marine organisms, including algae, produce fluorescent or 429 
chemiluminescent proteins naturally, although the actual function of such activity is poorly 430 
understood. 431 
 432 
Nutritional Selection  433 
Genetic modification can be used to create knock-out strains where one or more genes encoding 434 
for amino acid (AA) production is lost. These strains are then only able to grow in the presence 435 
of supplemented media and can then be used as a platform for further modifications where the 436 
gene is added back in as a selective gene (thereby returning them to the wild-type state) and the 437 
transformants selected in minimal media lacking the specific amino acid. Such strains would 438 
have no competitive advantage over their wild type counterparts.  Additional pathways can also 439 
be engineered into algae to aid production efficiency: for example, a phototroph could be grown 440 
heterotrophically with the addition of a suitable sugar transporter. Such a modification may not 441 
have a direct impact on the actual target product itself, but would indirectly benefit the 442 
production process economics. The introduction of a new biochemical capacity in such a manner 443 
could confer lower, neutral or higher fitness depending on the modification and thus the fitness 444 
of the GM algae relative to the wild-type and would need to be considered in the environmental 445 
risk assessment. For example, it could have the potential to occupy new environments not 446 
  
normally suited to the species where the sugar or other compound is present at biologically 447 
relevant concentrations, and thus cause a shift in community population dynamics. 448 
 449 
Reproduction and gene transfer 450 
Many microalgal species persist in a haploid state and reproduce asexually and there are many 451 
genera in which sexual reproduction has yet to be observed. In many species however, given 452 
specific environmental cues, asexual reproduction often switches to a sexual state enabling 453 
populations to increase the level of genetic recombination. Maintaining a production strain in an 454 
asexual state minimises opportunity to transfer genes to other compatible strains and also the 455 
frequency of horizontal gene transfer from contaminant strains. The risks from both gene 456 
introgression and contamination of cultures are therefore reduced.  The use of sexually 457 
reproducing algae is likely to increase the potential for gene transfer unless there are specific 458 
incompatibilities between species. That being said, even species exhibiting complex sexual life 459 
cycles such as Phaeodactylum tricornutum [55] can be maintained in a non-sexual state by strict 460 
management of growth conditions [56], a state easily achievable in a highly controlled closed 461 
photobioreactor system, but much less so in an open system or in the event of an escape to 462 
surrounding surface waters.  463 
 464 
Horizontal Gene Transfer 465 
Horizontal gene transfer (HGT) refers to one of several natural processes for the acquisition of 466 
genetic information via the stable transfer of genetic material from one distantly related organism 467 
to another outside of reproduction and without human intervention.  468 
  
The genome of almost every organism shows the result of many ancient HGT events [57] either 469 
as a result of direct DNA uptake or the result of virally or endosymbiosis-mediated DNA 470 
transfer. For example, analysis of ancient phylogenetic relationships and the  non-lineal 471 
evolutionary origin of genetic material has demonstrated that both Prokaryotic and Eukaryotic 472 
genes have been transferred across diverse groupings such as chromalveolates via endosymbiotic 473 
gene transfer [58]. These kinds of events in Eukaryotes however are rare, but have led to the 474 
diversification of chromalveolata from a single ancestral cell to the major clade we see today. 475 
More common is the widespread occurrence of HGT involving bacteria and viruses, the most 476 
prominent example of which is the rapid spread of antibiotic resistance genes amongst 477 
pathogenic bacteria.  478 
In order for viral genes and proteins to function correctly inside their hosts they must be suitably 479 
adapted to and be compatible with the genetic background of the host. This closely integrated 480 
host–virus  compatibility creates the opportunity for genes to move between lineages via HGT 481 
[59]. The use of high throughput sequencing has enabled researchers to document the occurrence 482 
of historical HGT in eukaryote algae /virus systems including coccolithoviruses, chloroviruses 483 
and prasinoviruses (all of which infect microalgae). Significant HGT has occurred between the 484 
marine microalgae Emiliania huxleyi and the coccolithoviruses in both the virus to host direction 485 
and the host to virus direction, including the viral acquisition of a near complete pathway for 486 
sphingolipid biosynthesis [60]. A major concern for GM microalgae use therefore, is that the 487 
modifications created may be transferred from the GMO via HGT into natural algae, bacteria or 488 
virus species in the environment, and thereby cause damage to ecosystems via selective 489 
advantage conferred by the transferred genes. If the GM algae is to be released into the 490 
environment (deliberate or accidental), then determination of the likelihood of gene transfer from 491 
  
the algae to an unintended recipient should be considered as part of any risk assessment, if data is 492 
available, as well as the impact that transfer of the transgene may have on unintended recipient 493 
populations.  494 
Significant efforts have been made to ascertain the risk of HGT from GM Crops to soil bacteria,   495 
though HGT from plants to bacteria has not been conclusively demonstrated and, in most cases, 496 
cannot be simulated in an optimized laboratory environment.  However, HGT may occur when 497 
transgenic plant material decomposes due to bacterial activity releasing plant DNA [61].  This 498 
has implications for directly using “waste” algal biomass as, for example, a crop fertiliser.  499 
The chance of HGT depends on multiple factors: The frequency of HGT is strongly influenced 500 
by whether the organism is multicellular; eukaryotes, such as plants for example, have a much 501 
lower relative frequency HGT than single celled prokaryote/eukaryote such as microalgae, which 502 
in turn have a lower frequency than, for example, viruses [57]. The genetic relationship between 503 
the donor and the recipient will also affect the likelihood of HGT occurring, with the frequency 504 
between distantly related species being much lower compared to HGT between the same species 505 
or closely related strains.  506 
The ecological relationship between the donor and the recipient is a particularly important 507 
consideration; microalgae often grow as a consortium of microorganisms in a symbiotic 508 
relationship and indeed many algae do not thrive when grown axenically. This is due to the fact 509 
that the majority of microalgae species lack the ability to synthesise their own B vitamins. 510 
Instead B vitamins produced by the associated bacterial consortia are used by the alga, and in a 511 
symbiotic relationship the bacteria appear to be able to use the carbon products of algal 512 
photosynthesis for their own growth [62, 63]. On an industrial scale it is unlikely that any algae 513 
could be grown truly axenically. The presence of other microorganisms and their close 514 
  
association in the growth matrix, will therefore increase the chances of HGT, but it will not be 515 
possible to determine the relative increase when compared to an axenic culture and so the focus 516 
of the ERA should be on potential impacts.  517 
The occurrence of HGT events will result in a secondary “GMO” which may give rise to adverse 518 
effects not controlled for by the management control measures imposed by the original licence or 519 
permit [57] and as such the initial risk assessment should try cover all possible outcomes. Whilst 520 
the emphasis tends to be on transfer of GM traits to wild organisms, perhaps an equally large risk 521 
is having GM algae acquiring wild type traits which could negate novel genetic traits in the GM 522 
algae designed to minimize its ability to survive in nature. Despite the theoretically low chances 523 
of HGT occurring from a GMO into the wild,  HGT cannot be dismissed by the research 524 
community, and many have recognized that methods of monitoring HGT are often too 525 
insensitive [64]. Accordingly, the risk management (which would normally include a monitoring 526 
program) must make room for advances in monitoring methodology to ensure not only the 527 
greatest environmental security possible but also to provide robust reassurance to the public. 528 
 529 
Choice of Growth facility 530 
GM algae production will most likely make use of both open and closed systems. These options 531 
have significantly different challenges in terms of environmental exposure and risks to human 532 
health and the environment. Closed systems, such as PBRs, have the potential to minimize 533 
contamination and environmental exposure, but this comes at a high capital expense. Outdoor 534 
pond systems have lower initial capital costs, but rely on outcompeting potential contaminating 535 
organisms by using densely grown monoculture starter cultures (which are usually generated in 536 
closed systems) [35]. In addition, since there are few economically viable physical protective 537 
  
measures for an open pond setting, the potential for GMO release is much higher due to aerosol 538 
dispersal, spillage, leakage, and vectors such as birds, insects and other animals (including 539 
humans). 540 
The types of growth facility available are many and varied and the choice of which is utilised 541 
will depend on available infrastructure and resources, and the type of GM algae to be grown.  542 
In addition to the type of growth facility used, the materials used in the facility construction will 543 
also play a role, not only in economic productivity/losses, but also in the overall biosecurity and 544 
will need to be factored into the risk assessment process. For example in a large scale pond 545 
facility the pond wall structure is one of the most costly elements of the set up but is also 546 
important in determining the levels of environmental exposure through leakage. As such 547 
assessing the available materials (such as clay, concrete, asphalt, fiberglass, rubber, high-density 548 
polyethylene) early on will enable an informed choice of material which achieves an appropriate 549 
balance between initial costs, facility longevity, and overall suitability for algal growth and 550 
containment. 551 
Large-scale cultivation of GM algae and extraction of derived products will require operations in 552 
accordance with good manufacturing practice. This can lead to a conflict between the measures 553 
designed to protect the operator and the environment and those designed to protect the product 554 
[65] and as such a balance must be struck to ensure protection of the environment and human 555 
health are not compromised. 556 
Where high-value low-volume products such as nutraceuticals or pharmaceutical grade products 557 
are to be produced, high levels of production control will be required to ensure consistency, 558 
minimise levels of impurity’s and maintain maximal productivity. In such instances the use of 559 
  
closed photobioreactors would be most appropriate. These units also carry the lowest risk of 560 
unintended release of the GM algae.  561 
The majority of large scale manufacturing facilities involving GMOs in the UK operate in 562 
contained bioreactors under containment level 1 with a few at containment level 2 which are 563 
principally for virus based vaccine manufacturing processes [65]. The majority of the 564 
commercially interesting wild-type strains fall into hazard category 1 (unlikely to cause human 565 
disease) with the exception of Chlorella spp. [66, 67] which has been known to cause 566 
chlorellosis in humans and animals via ingress though open wounds. Whilst these events are very 567 
rare they would result in Chlorella potentially falling under hazard category 2 (can cause animal 568 
and in very rare instances human disease but is unlikely to spread to the community and effective 569 
treatments are available) [68]. As such, so long as the GM modification does not create,  for 570 
example, enhanced pathogenicity or virulence in humans or animals [57] it is likely that GM 571 
microalgae production in closed PBR type facilities will also operate at containment level 2 or 572 
below. 573 
For low-value, high-volume production of biomass for aquaculture, biofuel or chemical 574 
commodities, outdoor raceway ponds are likely to be the only cost effective set up. However 575 
growing GM algae in this kind of system offers no protection to the environment and therefore 576 
these kinds of commercial facilities for GM algae  would be considered  as deliberate release, 577 
which would require the full EU Part C application for commercialisation and release which 578 
involves an environmental risk assessment and post market environmental monitoring [12]. The 579 
use of industrial scale glass houses and polythene tunnels would offer a reasonable level of 580 
containment under most circumstances. These could  provide not only a level of protection to the 581 
environment but simultaneously  protecting the algae crop from predation and weather effects 582 
  
such as storms and large temperature fluctuations across the year that could cause production 583 
inefficiencies [69]. However the cost of enclosing ponds is likely to be prohibitive for the 584 
majority of larger-scale production systems.  585 
 586 
Environmental Exposure 587 
There are a variety of mechanisms by which GM algae may become released into the 588 
environment during their production, processing and disposal, as well as their growth media. 589 
Release of GMOs into the environment can fall into two basic categories: deliberate and 590 
accidental, and measures should be taken to minimise unwanted releases and to manage their 591 
environmental impact if an event takes place. 592 
 593 
Unintended Releases: Containment failure, system leaks, release during transport and 594 
sterilisation failure prior to disposal would all be considered accidental or unintended releases. 595 
Leaks from a bioreactor could lead to a significant algal release and containment measures 596 
should be considered to contain any such leaks so escaped algae do not disperse into the 597 
surrounding environment. This often involves forms of bunding, with bunded areas treated 598 
periodically to destroy residual algae.  599 
Harvesting will involve the processing of large volumes of liquid including the transfer from the 600 
growth reactor to dewatering systems and then on to the product extraction system. At this stage 601 
leakage and spillage are almost inevitable. The water recovered during dewatering will need to 602 
be fed directly back into the growth reactor with additional nutrients, or processed to ensure any 603 
surviving algae and pathogens are rendered non -viable prior to disposal of the water. Failure of 604 
waste water treatment could lead to significant algal release directly into habitable environments. 605 
  
Consideration should also be given as to how and where the GM algal biomass will be 606 
processed. For example, will it need to be transported off site to a processing plant and if so will 607 
the material need to be transported wet or dried, and will it be rendered non-viable before 608 
transport? Dried algae, depending on the strain, may still be viable and therefore can still pose a 609 
significant dissemination risk, despite the ease and preference for transporting a reduced biomass 610 
volume.  Live algal suspensions (either concentrated or not) are bulkier and could be 611 
prohibitively expensive to transport, but may require less pre-processing to create and could be 612 
considered under many circumstances to be easier to generate and control. A large, unplanned 613 
release into a water course could however result in a high level of local exposure and a potential 614 
for environmental harm. 615 
Due to the risk of horizontal gene transfer, disposal methods for GMOs and their associated 616 
waste streams need to address the destruction of both the organism and the genetic material [61]. 617 
There are various sterilisation methods employed which can be roughly classified into four 618 
categories: heat, electromagnetic wave (UV, Gamma wave and microwave), filtration, and 619 
chemical sterilisation [70]. 620 
For very low level contamination of waste water, the use of filtration and UV light treatment can 621 
be very effective. However, microalgae are incredibly diverse and the resistance of some algae to 622 
UV radiation and other treatment technologies can be significantly higher than that of others. In 623 
addition high population loadings can cause significant reductions in efficacy, e.g. for UV 624 
irradiation, as partial shading reduces effectiveness.  625 
As with UV, not all organisms can be killed effectively with chemicals such as chlorine and if 626 
chemical sterilisation is to be used the efficacy will need to be validated and monitored.  627 
Chemical use can induce flocculation that reduces chemical exposure to shielded internal cells in 628 
  
a similar manner to antibiotic resistance in biofilms. Furthermore, the ecological impact of the 629 
chemical utilised will also need to be assessed, heat and pressure (autoclaving) is the preferred 630 
method of sterilising solid waste but could be impractical and cost prohibitive for water 631 
treatment on an industrial scale. Inline heat treatment (like the systems used in milk 632 
pasteurisation) could be effective, however the temperature and exposure time required for 633 
effective sterilisation would need to be assessed (and monitored) for each individual GM algae 634 
strain. 635 
Large volumes of biomass are unlikely to be disposed of directly since the algal biomass is in 636 
most cases the end product, and where the algae has been modified to produce a defined 637 
metabolite, the residual (waste) biomass can be used for added value in alternative applications 638 
such as biofuel, aquaculture or agricultural feedstocks [71]. If however, a large scale biomass 639 
disposal was required (presumably when the GM algae is employed in a bioremediation or 640 
similar application), composting could offer a cost effective method.  The relatively high 641 
temperatures (greater than 55°C) over a prolonged period (15-21 days) combined with ammonia, 642 
sulphur and other toxic metabolite production can combine to destroy the GMOs and degrade 643 
cellular contents [61].  644 
 645 
Deliberate release includes the use of open pond growth systems since they provide no 646 
protection against natural dispersion by weather and animal vectors of the GMO into the 647 
environment. Although not directly intended, release is inevitable. Escape may also occur 648 
through aerosol formation related to the turbulence and aeration necessary for cultivation. 649 
Additional consideration should also be given to accidental discharge, sabotage of systems, or 650 
natural disasters leading to a release. Such disaster scenarios are often envisaged as ‘worst case 651 
  
scenarios’ but in reality, the long term, low level release from a fully operational industrial 652 
activity is likely to have greater ecological impact than any one single unplanned release event. 653 
 654 
Other factors associated with GM Microalgae  655 
Enhanced lipid content 656 
Several studies in recent years have focused on increasing the level of total lipid accumulation 657 
within algal cells, primarily by deregulating triacaylglyceride (TAG) storage [72, 73]  such that 658 
the biomass can be used for the generation of biofuels. Additional studies have looked at 659 
elevating the accumulation of specific oil components such as polyunsaturated fatty acids 660 
(PUFAs) for use in the nutraceutical and aquaculture markets [11, 74, 75].  In the majority of 661 
studies, redirecting carbon metabolism to favour accumulation of lipids causes a reduction in 662 
growth rate, compared to the wild type though this is not always the case. It is therefore unlikely, 663 
given the suboptimal environmental growth conditions (compared to those of the mass culture 664 
conditions), that these released GM algae would persist in the environment at a significant or 665 
damaging level.  666 
Since the biochemical and, therefore nutritional, content of these GM strains is altered, the 667 
impact of release on food webs should be considered. Dietary lipid content and composition is a 668 
critical factor for a range of organisms throughout the food web. Larval development and growth 669 
during early life stages in the Blue mussel Mytilus galloprovincialis and clam venerupis 670 
pullastra, for example, have a critical requirement for a specific composition of lipids, especially 671 
long chain polyunsaturated fatty acids (omega 3 and 6) [76, 77].  Exposure to (and consumption 672 
of) GM strains designed for biofuel applications, where short chain saturated fatty acid 673 
production predominates, could therefore have significant negative health impacts, whereas 674 
  
omega 3 production platforms may actually have a positive impact on health at various trophic 675 
levels. 676 
 677 
Enhanced Biomass productivity (shade effects and photosynthetic ability) 678 
The density of algae that can be grown in PBRs is invariably affected by the levels of light 679 
received and ultimately self-shading by the growing culture, which limits the overall density that 680 
can be achieved [78]. Improving biomass production can be achieved via a reduction in cellular 681 
pigmentation (especially chlorophyll content), which results in a reduction in the shade effect 682 
[79] and which can be achieved by altering the activity of genes involved in the chlorophyll 683 
biosynthesis pathway [80]. Pigment binding complexes are required not just for light harvesting 684 
but also required for photo-protection and as such strains with modified pigmentation are often 685 
more susceptible to photosensitivity under high light conditions, which can have a negative 686 
impact on production in a growth system with uncontrolled lighting (i.e. outdoor).  A second 687 
approach to improving biomass productivity is to modify strains to improve the overall 688 
photosynthetic efficiency via a reduction in antenna size, defined as TLH (truncated light-689 
harvesting) mutant strains [81], by altering genes that encode light harvesting complex (LHC) 690 
proteins, their import into the chloroplast, or translational regulation. In the event of escape, 691 
increased photosynthetic ability or a reduction in pigmentation may confer an advantage since 692 
these modified strains would be able to occupy a modified environmental niche location in 693 
comparison to their wild type counterparts. Colonization of a deeper position in the water 694 
column for example could impact on native strains with whom they are not normally in 695 
competition the effects of which would be unknown. 696 
 697 
  
Production of human therapeutic proteins 698 
Recombinant therapeutic proteins are used widely in the biopharmaceuticals industry and whilst 699 
the majority of these are produced in bacteria, yeast or mammalian cell culture, interest in 700 
producing human therapeutic proteins from algae based platforms has grown in recent years   701 
[82]. It is unlikely that any of the therapeutic proteins such as antibodies and hormones [82-84] 702 
that are of primary interest for expression would confer any selective advantage on the GM algae 703 
in the natural environment, though as with all modifications this would have to be confirmed on 704 
a strain by strain basis comparison to the parental wild type strain. It is likely that the overall 705 
fitness of such GM algae would be considerably lower due to the metabolic pressure of over 706 
expressing “unnecessary” (as far as the algae are concerned) proteins. 707 
 708 
Monitoring  709 
A survey, both molecular and observational, of information on the environment surrounding 710 
production site such as local climate conditions, native flora and fauna, and details of any 711 
compatible (sexually or HGT) wild relatives to the GM algae should be made prior to 712 
production. This base level data can then be used in assessment programs, and will enable 713 
effective monitoring of long term cumulative effects in the event of a release [18]. Natural 714 
communities are usually in flux and can vary enormously over many spatial and temporal scales. 715 
The monitoring program should include keynote species representing the diversity and 716 
ecosystem functions of the natural fauna and flora, the GMO itself and species directly related to 717 
it within an area appropriate to the site and scale of activity. The strength and depth of the 718 
baseline survey will determine how easily GMO induced perturbations can be identified, and 719 
allow unexpected deviations to be investigated and acted upon if required. The establishment of 720 
  
standard molecular based surveys to monitor not only for the transgene/s but also for community 721 
alterations will be critical to the success of the ERA.   722 
 723 
Conclusions and recommendations  724 
In preparing a risk assessment and process design for large scale production of GM algae we 725 
advocate that a common sense and precautionary approach should be used e.g. the use of 726 
contained PBR facilities in preference to open ponds.  Where this is not feasible, the ponds 727 
should be contained within secondary containment such as glass houses or polythene tunnels if 728 
appropriate. This would serve to restrict the release of the GM algae into the environment and 729 
would benefit the grower through reduced productivity losses from predation, contamination and 730 
weather events, and would provide a level of reassurance and security from those organisations 731 
that may otherwise look to cause damage to the facility/ crop. Whilst the majority of GM algae 732 
will display reduced fitness in comparison with wild type strains, the sheer abundance of GM 733 
algae associated with an industrial monoculture process, could cause the displacement and 734 
disruption of local species, creating unintended and unforeseen ecosystem damage in the event of 735 
a large scale release.  736 
Much can be learnt from existing industrial practises involving microalgae: the piecemeal 737 
feeding of GM microalgae into the natural environment through normal operational conditions is 738 
likely to have a similar effect as to the equivalent wild type species. Indeed, industrial activity 739 
with GM microalgae is likely, in the first instances, to take place at existing production facilities 740 
using modified versions of established strains, therefore a wealth of information on, and 741 
experience of dealing with, the local biotic environment should already be available for these 742 
ventures. The release of or transfer of modified genetic material to other organisms, and the 743 
  
nature and impact of that material outside of controlled facilities is less well understood, and this 744 
is where risk assessment will need to be as broad and forward thinking as is possible to ensure no 745 
detrimental consequences are created. The removal of ‘accessory’ unused primary selection 746 
associated material, such as antibiotic resistance, may prove to be an essential part of the R&D 747 
pipeline to avoid unnecessary risk to both human and environmental health downstream. The 748 
future is bright for algal biotechnology, the potential for microalgae to offer solutions relating to 749 
energy, food & water security and health in the 21
st
 century and beyond is without doubt, as is 750 
the necessity that this will involve genetic modification. With this potential comes a 751 
responsibility to the health and wellbeing of both the natural environment and the anthropogenic 752 
environment (which can no longer be regarded as distinct), which will require careful thought, 753 
deliberation, assessment and action as appropriate. The new era of environmental risk assessment 754 
for GM microalgae has begun, whilst we do not yet have all the answers, we are at least 755 
beginning to identify the right questions to ask.  756 
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Figure 1. Risk Analysis Decision Support System: Factors to consider in relation to the 1002 
“parent” wild type, the GM algae and the production life cycle.  1003 
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